Navigating the Aftermath of Crisis and Risk in Mexico and Turkey by Marois, Thomas & Muñoz-Martínez, Hepzibah
1	  
	  
This	  is	  the	  Accepted	  Version	  of	  a	  forthcoming	  article	  that	  will	  be	  published	  by	  Emerald	  in	  Research	  in	  Political	  
Economy,	  Vol.	  31,	  2016:	  http://www.emeraldinsight.com/series/rpec	  
Accepted	  Version	  downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22608/	  	  
Navigating the Aftermath of Crisis and Risk in Mexico and Turkey 
 
Thomas Marois  
School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG 
tm47@soas.ac.uk 
 
Hepzibah Muñoz-Martínez 
Department of History and Politics, University of New Brunswick Saint John 
100 Tucker Park Road, PO Box 5050, Saint John, New Brunswick, Canada E2L 4L5 
hmartine@unb.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2	  
	  
 
 
NAVIGATING THE AFTERMATH OF CRISIS AND RISK IN MEXICO AND TURKEY 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article aims to expose the economic and political relations of power disguised in 
the concept of financial risk as institutionalized in post-crisis economic policies and 
practices. We do so by examining, from a historical materialist approach, the actors 
and social struggles implicated in the aftermath of crisis in Mexico and Turkey. We 
argue that Mexican and Turkish state authorities have targeted workers so that they 
may disproportionately bear the costs of financial uncertainty and recurrent crises as 
workers, taxpayers, and debtors in the aftermath of the 2008-09 crisis. We emphasize, 
though, that there are important institutional mediations and case study specificities. 
Mexico’s reforms that target labour as one of the main bearers of financial risk have 
been locked into legislation and constitutional changes. Turkey’s policies have been 
implemented in a more ad hoc manner. In contemporary capitalism, we see risk as not 
confined to national borders but as also flowing through the world market. We further 
argue that the World Bank Report 2014 Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for 
Development  emerges out of and reflects such real world responses to crisis that have 
been predominantly shaped by advocates of neoliberalism, to the benefit of capital. As 
an expression internal to global capitalism, the World Bank Report functions to 
legitimise the exploitative content of contemporary financial risk management policy 
prescriptions. Democratized financial alternatives that privilege the needs of workers 
and the poor are required. 
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Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis state authorities around the globe 
have undertaken new rounds of neoliberalization. These have included hardcore 
neoliberal projects like new privatizations, liberalization processes, the narrowing 
influence of democratic practices over economic reforms, and more restrictive labour 
reforms (Peck and Brenner 2012; Pradella and Marois 2015). Neoliberalization has 
also, and increasingly so, been about intensified financial liberalization, despite crisis, 
and associated processes of financial risk management. The latter is exemplified by 
the World Development Report 2014, Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for 
Development  (World Bank 2013) and the focus topic of this special issue on Risk 
Management in Neoliberal Capitalism. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2008-09 crisis 
financial risk has become a powerful buzzword meant to shape the contemporary 
political and economic practices of financial institutions and nation-states alike. Risk in 
this discourse is often associated with economic and political uncertainty, the 
probabilities of economic return and loss, or decision-making processes related to 
avoid financial losses (Holzer and Milo 2005: 225). Yet the concept of risk, as 
conventionally understood and practically employed, renders invisible the exploitative 
social relations needed to generate profits from capital accumulation and the class 
actors that differentially gain and lose in these processes.  
 
For this reason, we aim to expose the economic and political relations of power 
disguised in the concept of financial risk as institutionalized in post-crisis economic 
policies and practices. We do so by examining, from a historical materialist approach, 
the actors and social struggles implicated in the aftermath of crisis in Mexico and 
Turkey. Consistent with the post-1980s trajectory of neoliberal reform, we argue that 
Mexican and Turkish state authorities in the aftermath of crisis have targeted the 
processes of labour as an important anchor of economic and financial stability. State 
authorities have targeted workers as agents so that they may disproportionately bear 
the costs of financial uncertainty and recurrent crises as workers, taxpayers, and 
debtors. We emphasize, though, that there are important institutional mediations and 
case study specificities. Mexico’s reforms that target labour as one of the main bearers 
of financial risk have been locked into legislation and constitutional changes. Turkey’s 
policies have been implemented in a more ad hoc manner. Despite such differences, 
forms of labour repression are consistent with the different state authorities’ and foreign 
and domestic capitalists’ attempts to manage the risky contradictions of finance-led 
capital accumulation in both countries. In contemporary capitalism, however, we see 
risk as not confined to national borders but as also flowing through the world market. 
We further argue that the World Development Report 2014 emerges out of and reflects 
such real world responses to crisis that have been predominantly shaped by advocates 
of neoliberalism, to the benefit of capital. As an expression internal to global capitalism, 
the Report functions to legitimise the exploitative content of contemporary financial risk 
management policy prescriptions. 
 
The argument is developed as follows. First, we frame our critical approach to the 
study of risk. Second, we compare how state authorities have instituted labour as an 
anchor of post-crisis restructuring in Mexico and Turkey. This core section is broken 
into three interrelated discussions: economic decision-making and class power; 
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restructuring, labour, and financial expropriation; and state policy and financialization. 
Third, we locate the World Development Report 2014 and its approach to financial risk 
management in the aftermath of crisis. This is followed by brief conclusion. 
 
Framing an Historical Materialist Approach to Financial Risk  
A historical materialist approach allows us to understand how risk is the expression of 
the calculation imperatives embedded in capital accumulation, where the processes of 
social labour embedded in the production of commodities (either material or immaterial) 
remain hidden. This calculation allows for the homogenous measuring of difference to 
calculate exposure to contingency, particularly the departure from the rate of capitalist 
return expressed as profit or loss (Bryan, Rafferty and Jefferis 2015; Martin 2015; 
Johnson 2013). This capitalist compulsion for calculation further disguises the 
processes of domination behind the notion of financial risk. An understanding of risk as 
the development of contradictions in capital accumulation offers insights into the social 
relations of conflict and domination behind risk, including how gains and losses are 
transferred to different social actors. Capital accumulation refers to the process of 
circulating value taking different material forms (finance, money, production activities 
and commodities) through various moments (production, circulation, realization)  
(Harvey 2010). Contradictory relations in capital accumulation are understood in a 
dialectical manner, where the opposing forces of both capital and labour are central to 
sustaining accumulation (Bryan 1995: 4). As a result, these contradictions do not 
disappear but rather are moved around and displaced (Harvey 2014: 4).  
 
Labour is central to both these contradictions, which becomes a commodity in the 
process of capital accumulation (Marx 1975: 282-284). This involves the pre-existence 
of a dispossessed population that has nothing else but their labour power to sell in 
order to subsist while producing a surplus above what the worker needs for its 
subsistence (Harvey 2014: 63-64). Likewise, labour involves consumption and, more 
generally, social reproduction. As Marx argues, the labour process is not only 
implicated in production but also in consumption (Marx 1973: 90, 414). This is also part 
of the process of social reproduction where consumption, unpaid labour and social 
processes at home and in the community reproduce workers and their labour power 
(Cleaver 2000: 70). From this perspective, labour in the process of capital 
accumulation is not only considered in the moment of production, but also involves 
social processes outside of it including dispossession and social reproduction. For that 
reason, the unemployed and dispossessed are part of the labour process. This allows 
us to understand labour in capital accumulation beyond the traditional factory floor. It 
also allows us to examine the role of workers in Mexico and Turkey in the accumulation 
process as commodified labour power as well as debtors. This is central to an analysis 
of policy mechanisms that transfer the costs of the intensification of the contradictions 
in Mexico’s and Turkey’s capital accumulation onto labour in the context of 
financialization.  
 
Financialization can be understood as the expansion of finance into all aspects of 
social life and as a historical transformation in capital accumulation, particularly in the 
ways in which different individuals, workers, capital, and the state are involved in those 
moments of capital connect to finance (Lapavitsas 2013). Costas Lapavitsas (2011) 
highlights that these changes are linked to the new capacity of corporations to obtain 
financial resources in international open markets, the shift in banking from traditional 
lending and savings activities towards the management of assets in open financial 
markets and the provision of financial services to workers, and the transformation of 
workers’ income into a source of financial profit through consumption-based debt 
(Lapavitsas 2009). The latter represents a new form of accumulation through 
dispossession involving the removal of present and future means of subsistence from 
workers (Harvey 2005). In this way, finance permeates every act of production, 
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consumption and social reproduction transforming it into potential financial assets that 
generate profit (Marazzi 2011: 107). Susanne Soederberg argues the importance of 
exploring the social power of money and its credit form under capitalism as fictitious 
capital and money-form revenue within financial processes (2014: 33-35). Otherwise, 
the concept of financialization can fetishize the realm of exchange and money without 
considering the power relations in production and exchange implicated in capital 
accumulation in its connection to money and credit (Soederberg, 2014: 21-22).     
 
This fetishization of financialization is reflected in the World Development Report. On 
the one hand, the Report promotes financial inclusion and the deepening of access to 
market financial broadly in society. On the other hand, the Report dedicates significant 
analysis to the required state regulatory and supervisory institutions required to support 
an enhanced role for finance in development.  
 
The processes of financialization are closely linked to neoliberalism as the former 
involves the restructuring and internationalization of the state to enable cross-border 
flows and to ensure an adequate and supportive financial apparatus (Marois 2012). 
Neoliberal policies carried out by state authorities since the late 1970s have aimed at 
the intensification of market discipline, reducing the collective power of organized 
labour, and the commodification of all realms of social life through austerity policies, re-
regulation, privatization, and downward pressure on wages (Saad-Filho and Johnston 
2005). The further commodification of labour has set the conditions for corporate 
welfare, monetarist and debtfarist neoliberal state policies in both Mexico and Turkey 
(Soederberg 2014: 47-60). As such, relations of economic and political power mediated 
and influenced politically and institutionally domestic policy experimentation within the 
confines of global neoliberal frameworks and the world market (See: Peck, 2004; 
Brenner et al. 2010). Within this perspective, the contemporary state is an institutional 
materiality grounded on capitalist social relations of production and social reproduction 
wherein different networks of power and resistance intersect politically to organize 
consent or dissent around particular strategies of accumulation (Poulantzas 1974; 
Jessop 1999).   
 
The interconnections between neoliberal transformation, financialization and corporate 
welfare since the 1990s are evident in Mexico and Turkey as state policies protected 
powerful capitalist interests through capital account liberalization and bank privatization 
(Marois 2012; Soederberg 2014: 56). With capital account liberalization in 1989, the 
Turkish and the Mexican economies became further integrated into the world market, 
making the convertibility of their currencies and exchangeability of assets and 
production more uncertain as international financial transactions began to take place at 
different exchange rates and interest rates. Subsequent neoliberal reforms, including 
bank privatizations, led to the deepening of financialization in both countries. In both 
Mexico and Turkey the large firms and holding groups began concentrating more 
wealth in and increasing their involvement with financial activities (Garrido 2005, 100; 
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000, 487). As a result, large capital groups extended 
ownership and control over larger portions of their economies and increased their 
participation in international financial markets throughout the 1990s in Mexico and early 
2000s in Turkey (UNCTAD 2011).  
 
State authorities in Mexico and Turkey sought to mediate the contradictions developed 
by financialization in the 1990s within a transitioning monetarist neoliberal policy 
framework by focusing on reserve accumulation, austerity and low wages to preserve 
the value of their currencies and profitability and maintain low inflation, particularly after 
the Mexican peso crisis of 1995 and Turkey’s 2001 financial crisis. Reserve 
accumulation remained central to the strength of the currency because it operates as 
an insurance against capital flight. Low inflation targets also helped to guarantee the 
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worthiness of assets based on stagnant wages. Austerity helped to ensure the 
repayment of interest and principal on public debt, transfers of money to foreign 
reserves and decreases in the circulation of money in the economy to guarantee low 
inflation. Low wages then became a way to compensate for an appreciated currency in 
order to maintain the competitiveness of exports (Muñoz Martínez and Marois 2014). 
While this diminished internal aggregate demand, the potential negative effects of this 
outcome were compensated by sustained demand in international consumer markets 
until 2009 (UNCTAD 2013).    
 
Monetarism and corporate welfarism led to the contraction of public provisioning, 
denigration of the public sphere and services, and neoliberal attacks on workers’ rights 
have forced labour to become more reliant on debt in order to meet subsistence needs 
(Harvey 2005; McDonald and Ruiters 2012; Roberts 2013). This was the starting point 
of the expansion of debtfarism in both Mexico and Turkey. Through debtfare neoliberal 
policies consumer credit replaced wages and social programmes, allowing the 
unemployed and underemployed to socially reproduced while subjecting to market 
discipline (Soederberg 2014: 60-61) 
 
Yet, diversity and conflict exist within the capitalist class as they are differentially 
connected to financialization, commodity production and distribution. Diversity and 
conflict also exists among workers in the context of increasing competition for jobs and 
wages, as the reserve army of labourers multiplies, and in relation to their access to 
debt and financial assets (Harvey, 1999: 69; Cleaver, 2000: 114). Both vary according 
to country specificity. Also, class interests do not directly control the political and 
economic conditions in which governments and state authorities formulate and 
implement policy (De Brunhoff 1978). Nevertheless powerful political and economic 
actors constantly seek to refashion neoliberal policies according to existing domestic 
institutional landscapes and in their own interests (Brenner et al. 2010: 202-3). The 
World Development Report 2014 openly acknowledges the significance of country fit 
and specificity, yet most recommendations to financial risk management 
disproportionately favour financial interests over those of workers by either passing the 
costs of risk onto labour or by advocating labour’s deeper subordination to market 
financial mechanisms, hence financialization.  
 
Anchoring Labour to Financial Risk Management in the Aftermath of Crisis 
 
When mortgage foreclosures increased in the US, mainly subprime, mortgage lenders, 
investment banks and hedge funds collapsed in 2007. The financial crisis spread over 
global credit markets as returns on risk increased rapidly and liquidity diminished. The 
initial impact of the crisis on Europe and the US in 2008 had serious consequences on 
Mexico and Turkey, as these countries rely economically for export markets and 
investment. The consequences were capital flight, reduced domestic production and 
currency depreciation (Muñoz-Martínez and Marois 2014). In their immediate response 
to the 2008-09 global crisis, Mexican and Turkish state authorities implemented the 
neoliberal and finance-led policies of reserve accumulation, inflation targeting, fiscal 
austerity and low wages developed since the mid-1990s (Muñoz-Martínez and Marois 
2014). Yet three significant differences emerged amidst the 2008-09 crisis. First, the 
balanced budgets of Mexico and Turkey obtained through foregoing austerity policies 
facilitated the crisis-induced implementation of public loan guarantees and stimulus 
packages geared towards benefitting Mexican and Turkish capitalist classes. Second, 
the central banks cut interest rates dramatically. In Mexico, interest rates decreased 
from 8.25 to 4.5 per cent in 2009 and in Turkey from 16.75 in 2008 to 6.75 per cent in 
2009. Third, fiscal spending and lower interest rates displaced the centrality of high 
interest rates in attracting portfolio investment and diminishing inflation. Cheap labour 
costs remained integral to the existing policy framework, nevertheless, in the aftermath 
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of the crisis. For this reason, Mexico and Turkey found themselves in a relatively 
favourable context following the global crisis, at least in terms of an open financial 
world market channelling ample, cheap global liquidity into these countries. These 
measures however took different institutional shape according to the balance of forces 
within each nation-state. 
 
In what follows, we illustrate how the variegated implementation of economic policy in 
Mexico and Turkey reflects the influence of class forces in shaping economic decision-
making during the post-crisis period of 2010-14. Mexican state authorities followed an 
orthodox approach to economic policy and locked in the role of labour as an anchor of 
economic stability through legal and constitutional changes. This was the outcome of 
an increasing interest convergence among the capitalist class dominated by large 
corporations around the economic agenda of an authoritarian Mexican state in the 
context of criminalization of dissent and violence. In contrast, Turkish state authorities 
approached post-crisis recovery in more unconventional ways and passed the costs of 
financialization onto workers in a less coordinated manner. In the context of deepening 
violence and repression, the increasingly authoritarian Turkish state still actively 
mediated conflicting interests within the capitalist class, particularly between large 
corporations, international investors and micro, small and medium size enterprises 
(MSMSE), but in a more heterodox approach to neoliberal deepening. In both cases, 
labour has been become more firmly instituted as an anchor of post-crisis neoliberal 
restructuring. It is worth highlighting here, moreover, that these real world crisis and 
recovery experiences precede, and inform, similar best practice policies presented by 
the World Development Report 2014. 
 
State Policy and Financialization 
In the aftermath of crisis, fiscal surpluses, reserve accumulation, and monetary 
interventions in Mexico and Turkey helped preserve the value of the peso and the lira 
respectively, albeit unequally so. These interventions also helped to protect the 
exchange rate value of financial assets in each country. This was central to non-
financial and financial firms operating in Mexico and Turkey as large national 
corporations became more implicated in open financial markets operations while banks 
in these countries increased their management operations in financial services (Muñoz 
Martínez 2014a; Akkemik and Özen 2014). 
 
Authorities worked to regenerate fiscal surpluses in both countries to help guarantee 
the repayment of public debt, accumulate reserves, and to credibly provide public loans 
guarantees to large companies operating in Mexico and Turkey. Yet the source of 
these fiscal revenues differed. In Mexico, the fiscal balance reached an average 
surplus of 1.32 per cent of GDP between 2010 and 2014, excluding the payment of 
debt interests and investment in the publicly owned oil company PEMEX (Banxico 
2014: 250). Fiscal balances were achieved through the increase of non-oil revenues, 
particularly the VAT and the use of oil derivatives. For instance, the VAT revenues 
increased from 3.4 per cent of GDP in 2009 to 3.9 in 2014 (Banxico 2014: 301). 
Through oil derivatives, the Ministry of Finance was able to exercise the option to sell 
oil at a higher price than the one offered in the spot market, particularly in the context of 
declining oil prices (Blas 2012). In 2015, the Ministry of Finance obtained $6.28 billion 
in gains from these financial contracts (Gómez Robles 2015). In Turkey, the Treasury 
reported surpluses of 0.6, 1.8, 0.8, and 1.0 per cent of GDP from 2010 to 2013. The 
positive revenues came from the wholesale sell-off of public lands to corporate 
developers, savings on expected debt interest payments, interest revenues from the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund’s capital base, and one-off revenues that included 
some tax arrears payments and significant privatizations (Treasury 2011-14). As 
austerity led to fiscal savings, the accumulation of foreign reserves increased – by 62 
percent in Mexico and by 57 percent in Turkey between 2010 and 2014 (Table 1). 
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Mexico and Turkey retained their international creditworthiness by facilitating the 
repayment of public debt and by helping to maintain the value of the currency through 
foreign reserve accumulation. In doing so, Mexico and Turkey exercised a core World 
Development Report best practice policies vis-à-vis financial risk management – 
namely, build up both fiscal and foreign reserve buffers in the ‘good’ times to overcome 
the ‘bad’ times, wherein Turkey was singled out as an example (World Bank 2013, 
235). 
 
The preservation of the value of Mexico’s and Turkey’s currency remained the focus of 
monetary policy, but in different ways. In Mexico, the Central Bank, through US dollar 
auctions, can intervene in foreign exchange markets by using international reserves. In 
December 2011 for example, the central bank, through the Foreign Exchange 
Commission (FEC), offered daily auctions of 400 million dollars at a the minimum price 
of 1.02 times of the Mexican peso, as determined by the exchange rate of the 
preceding business day (Banxico 2011: 54). In 2012, there were three auctions worth 
646 million dollars. This mechanism was triggered when the exchange rate depreciated 
by two per cent vis-à-vis the US dollar with respect to the previous day. The FEC 
suspended these auctions in 2013 and then resumed them in 2014 (IMF 2015a). This 
central bank intervention aimed at providing liquidity to the Mexican financial sector and 
at increasing the supply of US dollars to boost the value of the Mexican peso. In Turkey 
US dollar auctions also constituted important direct interventions aimed at protecting 
the currency. For example, on 10 July 2013 the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) sold off 
$1.4 billion to defend the falling Lira. Six months or so later, on 23 January, the CBT 
sold off $3 billion to the same end. This conventional mechanism has been 
supplemented in Turkey. In late 2011 the CBT designed and implemented an 
unorthodox monetary intervention mechanism through the Reserve Options 
Mechanism (ROM) in late 2011. The ROM enables banks in Turkey to hold a given 
ratio of their TL reserve requirements in foreign exchange (FX) and gold (Alper et al. 
2013, 2). Central Bank authorities affect the cost of using the ROM by adjusting the 
ratio of FX/gold needed to cover Lira required reserve levels on a daily basis. The 
intent was to stem short-term inflows, moderate domestic credit growth, and assist 
exchange rate and inflation volatility by encouraging banks to keep more of their own 
required reserves in FX (IMF 2012, 1; Aslaner Çıplak, Kara and Küçüksaraç 2015, 4). 
In this case, monetary policy in Mexico and Turkey demonstrated, in different ways, a 
WDR 2014 concern for the prudential use of foreign reserves macroprudential as part 
of financial risk management preparedness as well as the pro-systemic stability use of 
countercyclical monetary policy and foreign reserve accumulation and reserve 
auctioning. 
 
Unlike rounds of neoliberal experimentation prior to the 2008-09 global financial crisis, 
protecting low interest rates remained central to the economic policy agenda in the 
aftermath of the crisis. A low interest regime, however, did not significantly affect these 
countries’ inflation rates, which stayed at comparatively low levels (Table 1). State 
authorities maintained low interest levels differently. The Mexican central bank further 
reduced the overnight inter-bank lending rate from 4.40 per cent in 2010 to 3 per cent 
in 2014. Authorities pursued low rates as a means of fostering growth and development 
through credit (Banxico 2012: 46).  
 
In Turkey in 2011 the Central Bank initiated the interest rate corridor (IRC) (Alper et al. 
2013; Aslaner et al. 2015). The IRC is defined by the difference between the Bank’s 
overnight borrowing and lending rates and it was conceived as part of Turkey’s 
financial authorities’ monetary toolkit to help manage exchange rate volatility through 
affecting short-term transactions. Consequently, interest rates in Turkey shift regularly, 
even chaotically, making the concrete determination of the interest rate in Turkey a 
complex exercise in and of itself (Candemir and Peker 2014). When first announced in 
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2011, for example, the IRC was between 5 and 12.5 per cent, with authorities offering 
rates nearer the top-end to control credit and to cool off the economy in line with its 
inflation target. The average interest rate for 2011, however, ended up around six per 
cent (Table 1). The IRC range then fell to the 3.5 to 7.5 per cent range, with the 
average running around 5.5 per cent for 2012 and then 4.5 for 2013. The goal of this 
type of monetary intervention was to curb credit growth to prevent inflation while 
fostering economic growth (Reuters 2011). While unorthodox in conventional terms, the 
intention was to nonetheless provide of financial stability in Turkey. This strategy, 
however, exposed both countries to foreign capital exit and borrowers’ currency 
mismatches that, in turn, would reinforce the apparent necessity for their state 
authorities to intervene given, in conventional views as in the WDR 2014, “the financial 
system is naturally procyclical” (World Bank 2013, 205; emphasis added). 
 
In both cases, fiscal surpluses, reserve accumulation and monetary interventions 
helped to provide currency stability as well as incentives for those investors and 
corporations holding financial assets (see capital account in Table 1). Yet, inflationary 
pressures from financialization remained while a relatively strong currency jeopardized 
profit from exports, particularly in a context of international demand (see current 
account in Table 1). The contradictions resulting from these policies were therefore 
mediated by maintaining low labour costs while creating internal aggregate demand 
through consumer credit, namely financial expropriation. At the same time state 
financial policy aimed to reduce the exposure finance capital faces to encourage their 
recurrent flows into each countries.   
 
Restructuring, Labour and Financial Expropriation  
In Mexico and Turkey post-crisis, state authorities facilitated the transferring of the 
costs of resuming fiscal surpluses and maintaining reserve accumulation processes 
onto labour. In the case of Mexico, reliance on VAT for revenues targeted workers 
because the latter cannot claim the tax credit on the VAT that large companies 
operating in Mexico receive. At the same time, VAT tax returns to companies have 
increased significantly since the 2000s (Banxico 2014). In Turkey, the dispossession of 
workers from public assets through privatization was key in the generation of fiscal 
surpluses. In relation to reserve accumulation, both central banks have to sterilize their 
reserves denominated in foreign currency by issuing public bonds. As a result, state 
authorities have to pay the cost of the spread between the interest rates in public debt 
and the returns they obtain from their foreign assets through austerity and regressive 
taxation (See Rodrik 2006; Cho 2014).  
 
More significantly, the new phase of low interest rates in economic policy signalled the 
consolidation of labour as a key mechanism to reduce inflation, directly putting 
downward pressure on wages, in both Mexico and Turkey. Such downward pressure is 
reflected in stagnant wages with hikes in food prices between 2010 and 2014 (Table 1).  
In Mexico, the difference between minimum wages in 2010 and 2014 was only 1.01 per 
cent while food prices have rose an average of 3.85 per cent in the same period (Table 
1). Workers’ wages decreased from 1.2 from 2003 to 2008 to -5.9 per cent from 2008 
to 2013 as a share of companies’ operations costs in Mexico (INEGI 2014). Indeed, the 
central bank has recognized that stagnant wages have facilitated the management of 
inflationary pressures coming from global financial volatility (Banxico, 2011: 22; 2012: 
17; 2013: 255; 2014: 43). Yet in terms of labour markets, the WDR 2014 approach is to 
bypass wage levels stagnation and to focus instead on market access and flexibility as 
a means of mitigating the risks workers face (2013, 10; 22; 27-8) 
 
This downward pressure in Mexico also took the form of constitutional reforms in 
relation to labour, education, oil sector and taxation. Both the labour reform of 2012 
and the transformation of the education system in 2014 promoted more flexible labour 
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contracts, leading to job insecurity. For instance, the new labour law introduced new 
forms of contracts to ease the dismissal of workers and diminish companies’ expenses 
in social benefits. The education reform was a labour flexibilization legislation that tied 
job security, promotion and wages to the assessment of teachers (Banxico 2013: 115; 
OECD 2015: 53). These reforms represented direct downward pressures on labour 
costs, consolidating the fixity of labour within Mexico’s borders as an important anchor 
of inflation. The energy reform of 2014 opened the state owned oil and electricity 
sectors to private investment (OECD 2015: 24-25). The privatization of the main source 
of state revenues exposed funding for public spending to the fluctuations of the market, 
enhancing the Mexican state’s self-imposed neoliberal austerity. The taxation reform 
eliminated corporate tax deductions related to workers’ fringe benefits, further 
decreasing large corporations’ incentives to provide these allowances to their 
employees. Also, authorities increased taxation on small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). These SMEs are usually income supplements to precarious wages or a 
replacement for the lack of job opportunities. This meant that the Ministry of Finance 
considered SMEs in the same position as large companies in terms tax obligations 
without having the tax credits received by large corporations (Flores 2013). At the 
same time regressive taxation remained intact, particularly in relation to the VAT and 
corporate tax exemptions.  
 
In Turkey from 2010 to 2014 Turkey the real minimum wage increased by about 10 per 
cent in PPP terms (Table 1). Minimum wages annual increases in 2013 and 2014 were 
1.85 and 1.29 percent respectively while food prices rose an extraordinary 9.1 percent 
and 12.6 percent in the same period (Table 1). Thus, increases in the minimum wage 
did not have a significant impact in the purchasing power of workers. These wage rises 
had a widespread, popular effect in a country where employment is dominated by 
agricultural and micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) (TÜİK 2012). 
Authorities felt the need to respond to the concerns of MSMEs by increasing indirect 
taxes in 2011 (see IMF 2012a, 8). The shift to indirect taxes, as opposed to direct, 
labour-based taxes, structurally benefits business but are regressive from a popular 
class perspective. In Turkey, indirect taxes now constitute 50 per cent of tax receipts 
and about 13 per cent of GDP (World Bank 2014). State authorities have sought to 
compensate employers for post-crisis wage increases by moving forward on plans to 
make the workforce more flexible to employers’ needs and by reducing direct payroll 
taxes (Duman 2014; MÜSİAD 2014).  
 
In post-crisis Mexico and Turkey, state authorities attempted to solve the problems 
arising from low wages, deteriorating labour conditions and low levels of global 
aggregate demand by spurring domestic demand through consumer debt. Between 
2010 and 2014 household outstanding loans to commercial banks increased 67 per 
cent in Mexico and by 103 per cent in Turkey (IMF 2015b). In the case of Mexico, 
promoting consumer debt-driven demand was part of major legal reforms carried out in 
2012. Financial reforms aimed at facilitating more access to credit to help Mexican 
households compensate for losses in their purchasing power (Banxico 2014: OECD 
2015). In 2009 consumer credit declined 19.1 per cent. But by 2010 it had increased by 
2.6 per cent, before skyrocketing by 19.7 per cent and 15 per cent in 2011 and 2012 
respectively (Banxico 2010: 32; 2011: 31; 2012: 31). Debtfare state policies and its 
consequences on credit availability for working crisis began in 2000, ranging from 
mortgages, micro-credit, payroll credit to retail lending (Soederberg 2014: 206-212). 
Foreign and domestic banks in Mexico, however, benefited from the changes in 
financial regulations as they facilitate creditors’ capacity to recover loan collateral and, 
by extension, reduce the banks’ financial risks (Hernández 2013; OECD 2015: 22). In 
Turkey, too, consumer debt has increased post-crisis. Consumer loans and credit card 
debt exploded from 1.8 per cent in 2002 to 12 per cent in 2009 to 18.7 per cent as a 
percentage of GDP in 2012 (Karacimen 2014, 163). The size of the increase, however, 
11	  
	  
was seen as constituting new substantial risks. For that reason, Turkey’s Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency sought to re-regulate the credit market in ways that 
did not stifle credits while balancing the need to mitigate default risks. In 2013-14 
consumer loan growth slowed, but still accounted for around 30 per cent of total bank 
loans (BAT 2014, I-10). 
 
In more critical terms, the changes associated with wider calls for ‘financial inclusion’ 
bring with them greater legal capacity for financiers to dispossess poorer individuals 
and households by more forcefully protecting creditors’ private property (that is, their 
loanable credits). To the extent that the negative side of financialization registers with 
IFIs like the World Bank, it is often couched in terms of legal consumer protection 
measures or the creation of a new financial ombudsperson to help mediate the often 
exploitative practices (or mounting financial risks) within consumer finance (indeed, 
citing Mexico as an example) (World Bank 2013, 203; Soederberg 2014: 194). 
 
The growing use of consumer credit in both countries reflects emerging survival 
strategies for workers and popular classes. It also represents financial expropriation as 
workers take credit and pay interest on it based on the expectation of future earnings. 
The need for such credit is materially tied to the labour market reforms that promote 
cheaper labour costs and more flexible conditions, which heighten the workplace 
precariousness at the same time that the disciplinary elements of using personal credit 
for daily needs are intensified. This condition entails very real, and exploitative, class 
relations as banks’ premise accumulation strategies around dispossessing workers of 
the earned income, while lobbying for stricter property rights laws to ensure repayment 
or repossession of goods should consumer debts be unpaid (Karicimen 2014).  
 
In both cases, the targeting of labour as bearers of the costs of capitalist contradictions 
in the context of financialization has led to higher levels of poverty and inequality in 
both countries. In Mexico and Turkey one of every five people lived in poverty in 2014 
(OECD 2014b). The share of the economy of the 20 wealthiest per cent increased from 
53.8 per cent to 54.1 in Mexico and from 45.64 to 46.59 in Turkey from 2006 to 2012 
(World Bank 2015). Mexican and Turkish authorities have managed to create and 
maintain a fiscal buffer that enables them to engage in windfall spending sprees at 
politically strategic moments, thus maintaining political rule, without falling into deficit 
and increasing debts, thus without threatening runaway inflation or financial 
creditworthiness imperatives. In this way neoliberal authorities have gone a long way to 
deepening the financial world market and ensuring its stability in their own particular 
corner – as mediated by the labour of workers. 
 
Economic Decision-Making and Class Power 
Both Mexican and Turkish authorities had similar policy goals in relation to currency 
stability, low interest rates and low inflation in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global 
financial crisis. Also, the outcome of transferring the costs of these policies onto labour, 
were comparable in both countries, particularly in relation to low wages, labour 
repression and inequality. Yet policy implementation took different forms: policy-making 
is contingent upon historically inherited forms of national regulation that involve multiple 
interests and socially-located actors embedded in place-specific power and class 
structures. The territoriality of state power and its position within the hierarchy of the 
world market infuse policy-making with a logic distinct from that of large globally-mobile 
corporations and other factions of the capitalist class. Neoliberal state officials have 
vested interests in promoting capitalist growth within their territory to use capital 
accumulation to sustain state power in the context of inter-state competition in the 
global economy (Harvey 2014: 157). At the same time, financial policy-making has 
tended towards the centralization and concentration of authority within independent, yet 
powerful, institutions. The conventional logic being that this decreases risks of 
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mismanagement and increases professional oversight in the interests if financial 
stability. In Mexico in the aftermath of crisis, policy implementation followed more 
orthodox measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and legally locked in 
measures to anchor economic stability to the price of labour power (Lagarde 2014). In 
Turkey, state authorities mediated highly divergent competing interests, shaping the 
heterodox forms of economic state intervention. In both cases, economic measures 
were implemented in the context of concentration of political power around the 
Executive in both countries.   
 
The orthodox economic path undertaken by Mexican state authorities hints at the 
dominance of a handful of corporations in the economy and the political convergence 
of Mexico’s capitalist class around the policy agenda set by a more authoritarian state. 
In the case of Mexico, the crisis set a new political juncture during the presidential and 
Congress elections of 2012. Economic stagnation and increasing violence during the 
National Action Party (PAN) presidency (2000-2012) led to the triumph of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the 2012 presidential elections and this party’s 
majority in Congress. In addition, the PAN presidential administration obstructed the 
momentum of the left-centre presidential in the 2012 presidential elections by allowing 
the PRI’s fraudulent practices in these elections to guarantee the continuation of 
neoliberalism (Dresser 2012). Economic and physical insecurity and the concentration 
of political power around the PRI set the conditions for the implementation of reforms 
that further consolidated labour costs and the dispossession of households, via low 
wages, austerity and consumer debt, especially through constitutional reforms and 
legal changes, as the main mechanism to manage the uncertainty of profits. In the 
aftermath of the crisis, the levels of violence increased while impunity remained. The 
number of disappearances rose to 12 500, almost half of the total disappearances 
since 2006 while 14 000 people were murdered only in 2015 (Redaccion AN 2015; 
Arturo Angel 2015). The constant threat of being killed or disappeared, whether by the 
state or drug cartels, incites fear, limiting the range of strategies that workers and the 
poor can use to bargain with both employers and the state and to protest against the 
deterioration of working conditions (Clercq Ortega and Sánchez Lara 2015). State 
security forces and organized crime units have abducted and threatened labour and 
human rights defenders as well as journalists (Muñoz Martinez 2014b). This climate of 
fear in Mexico serves as a form of social control under neoliberalism, by constraining 
social dissent (Muñoz Martinez 2015). Constrained social dissent alongside an 
increasingly insulated financial apparatus reflect neoliberal calls for depoliticization. 
 
The aftermath of crisis in Mexico witnessed a parallel process of converging interests 
among financial investors, large Mexican companies, and the export sector around 
ensuring the low cost of labour within Mexico. The low cost of labour was not only 
beneficial to the Mexican and foreign exporting sector in the country but also to large 
Mexican corporations with national production and financial investors participating in 
the market of Mexican private shares and bonds. For that reason, the Association of 
Mexican banks, which represent the financial sector, the Business Coordinating 
Council and the Mexican Employers’ Association, which advocate for the interests for 
the Mexican companies and the Executive Council of Global Enterprises, strongly 
supported the economic agenda of Mexico’s authoritarian state (Robles Miaja 2015; 
González 2015; CEEG 2015). In general, most business associations, which are 
dominated by large Mexican and global companies, championed the post-crisis 
restructuring and economic reforms because they not only lowered labour costs but 
also opened new areas of investment to safeguard their existing investments in 
Mexican assets (Pallares Gómez 2015)..  
 
In Mexico one main source of discontent among the capitalist in relation to restructuring 
and economic reforms was an increase in corporate taxation, particularly in the 
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exporting companies, global corporations in the food industry and the service and 
commerce sector (Redacción 2013). Export processing industries, large food 
companies and the commerce and service sector disagreed with increasing taxation 
(Redacción 2014). Still, these interests remained supportive of the labour, education 
and energy reforms because the latter allowed large corporations to access cheaper 
credit and investment telecommunications and energy markets. And ultimately, the 
consensus relied on the state authorities’ ability turn labour into the main mechanism to 
manage inflationary pressures and currency instability and provide conditions of 
production at low cost (KPMG 2015: 10, 13, 16, 21, 45). This shows how the political 
consensus around the PRI’s economic agenda allowed state authorities to implement 
orthodox measures to deal with capitalist contradictions in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
In Turkey in the aftermath of crisis, policy-making was heavily influenced by the state 
authorities’ balancing of the needs of Turkey’s large corporations and the politically 
significant MSMEs. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed an 
increasingly autocratic approach to governing under Prime Minister, then since 2014 
President, Tayyip Erdoğan. A series of elections shaped the politics of the period. 
Turkey faced general elections in 2011 and in 2015. These were punctured by 
nationwide local elections in the spring of 2014 and the first-ever Presidential election 
in the summer of 2014 (which went to Erdoğan). The AKP retained its majority 
government until the June 2015 general elections, losing its majority status held since 
2002 but still earning about 40 per cent of the vote. President Erdoğan drove Turkey 
into snap reelections for November 2015 while the AKP-led caretaker government 
reignited civil war in Turkey with the Kurdish population. This was an attempt to use the 
politics of fear to regain Parliamentary control. Violence increased across Turkey, 
marked by suicide bombings and widespread insecurity, and the AKP captured over 49 
per cent of the vote and a majority mandate in November. The AKP majority win 
opened a renewed phase of authoritarian practices. This centralization of power around 
the Executive relied on a careful balancing of competing economic class interests 
within Turkey’s capitalist class. This provides insights into the way in which domestic 
class structures influenced the unorthodox economic measures implemented in the 
aftermath of the crisis in Turkey.    
 
An economic agenda focused on maintaining a disciplined, flexible, and lower cost 
labour force cut across and united the class interests of three prominent capitalist 
groups:  larger holding group ‘Istanbul’ capital, often smaller MSME ‘Anatolian’ capital;  
and foreign investors (cf. Hosgör 2011; IMF 2014). Both domestic capitalist groups 
have vested interests in low labour costs to keep input costs down, supporting their 
competitiveness. Yet they differ on access to credit and currency stability. This too 
helps explain the implementation of unorthodox monetary interventions, particularly the 
IRC and the ROM. For example, representatives of Anatolian capital point to the need 
to increase competition in Turkish labour markets, but also to increase their access to 
cheaper loans from the banks in Turkey (MUSIAD 2014, 19; 28-9). This is significant as 
retained earnings are a major source of investment financing for MSMEs, so the lower 
the wage bill the more capital available for investment. At the same time, the MSMEs 
are major exporters, and thus have an interest in anti-inflationary policies to stabilize 
business planning as well as competitive exchange rate and access to cheap credit. 
For that reason, the IRC remained in place to foster access to credit through relatively 
low rates. At the same time, disagreement over the IRC has come from international 
financial investors as well as Istanbul capital (Bogler 2015).  
 
Istanbul capital shares an expressed interest in greater labour flexibility, which allows 
them to likewise adjust export production costs more smoothly according to world 
market conditions (Duman 2014). But Istanbul capital has a much stronger stake in 
maintaining access to cheap foreign finance. This in turn depends on the strength of 
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the currency and profitability. The Central Bank implemented the ROM not only to 
guarantee demand for the TL but to also allow commercial banks to borrow additional 
foreign exchange to free up TL held in the Central Bank and gain from lending money 
domestically in liras at attractive rates (IMF 2013). In contrast to MSMEs, Istanbul 
capital alongside foreign investors have lobbied for an increase in interest rates to 
increase the profitability of their financial assets tied to the TL. Turkish state authorities 
act to balance the interests between the two major fractions of domestic capital, 
Anatolian and Istanbul capital, with a view to workers and popular classes in order to 
support its domesticated form of neoliberalization.  
 
Contrary to any expectation that authoritarian neoliberalism and downward pressure on 
labour would lead to a virtuous cycle of growth and prosperity for all, latent 
contradictions remain in Mexico’s and Turkey’s capital accumulation strategies due to 
the short term composition of these capital flows as workers continue to reap few, if 
any, substantive benefits. Thus state policies have not made capitalist contradictions 
disappear but rather transferred them and intensified them in a particularly class-based 
fashion. In addition to increasing levels of poverty and inequality, the Ministry of 
Finance continues to issue public bonds, increasing the levels of public debt in the 
aftermath of the crisis (Table 1). In this sense, the constant threat of devaluation, the 
volatility of public debt markets and the cost of repayment of government bonds has 
increased the vulnerability of the Mexican economy. The financing needs in the country 
have increased to compensate for increasing imports and foreign liabilities as well as to 
compensate for the potential decline of foreign direct and portfolio investment (Johnson 
2015). In Turkey, private debts have been on a sharp upswing since 2010 (in part 
enabled by austerity-driven public debt decreases) (BAT 2015, I-8). Mounting private 
debts have unintentionally helped to undermine the value of fixed assets held in TL 
terms in Turkey (despite public austerity measures to counter this).  
 
Accounts within the political economy of finance that seek to sterilize contemporary 
economic realities by reading class dynamics out of global financial processes obscure 
the highly politicized and often violent nature of financial risk management today. This 
can lead to a distortion of the real costs (and benefits) of finance for development 
strategies promoted by IFIs and of the policies state authorities undertake to mitigate 
what are understood as necessary risks for developmental progress. The 
problematization of notions of risk and risk management promoted by IFIs such as the 
World Bank through the 2014 World Development Report is crucial to reveal the 
political nature and exploitation hidden in technical solutions to financial crisis and 
recurrent instability.   
 
In the Aftermath of Crisis: Locating the World Development Report 2014 
With the rise of neoliberalism and in the aftermath of crisis, we see in the cases of 
Mexico and Turkey that the responsibility for protecting the world market involves 
complex methods of labour repression within national borders in ways constitutive of 
the financial world market. So too does this occur at the level of contemporary IFIs. 
These institutions gain knowledge from national and world market processes and 
provide important institutional and material resources in ways that shape domestic and 
world financial markets. The World Development Report 2014 (WDR 2014) and in its 
approach to financial risk management represents a specific neoliberal synthesis of 
market-oriented policy knowledge and technical expertise. This section reads the WDR 
2014 in light of our study of Mexico and Turkey. We argue that the WDR is not neutral 
representation of knowledge, but class-based and disproportionately functions in the 
interests of financial capital and neoliberal continuity. The WDR 2014 does so through 
its representation of financial risk management. Specifically, the Report mystifies and 
naturalises its neoliberal approach; then conceptually neutralizes it; and finally is 
concretely delimits the legitimate confines of policy as neoliberal. Each step accepts 
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labour as a natural anchor of financial crisis management, and hence contemporary 
financialization.  
 
The WDR 2014 begins by mystifying and naturalizing its presumed class-neutral 
approach to financial risk. The Report frames risk management as a necessary state 
policy tool for development (World Bank 2013, 3, 5). ‘Risk’ is then defined as the 
‘possibility of loss’, posed both as a burden for state authorities but equally as 
indispensable for creating developmental opportunities (World Bank 2013, 4-5). ‘Risk 
management’ is thus conceived as increasing one’s capacity to minimize losses and to 
increase the benefits of taking risks (2014, 5; 8). In this narrative, risk management is 
pitched as in the benefit of all, linking investors and workers together, and as 
necessary for preventing future developmental setbacks (World Bank 2014, 8; 62). The 
WDR 2014 here continues a theme established in the World Bank’s 2012 inaugural 
Global Financial Development Report 2013: The Role of State in Finance (World Bank 
2012; also see World Bank 2013, 18; 21). In both World Bank reports, the message 
remains that greater exposure to global financial markets is vital for development; yet, 
given recurrent financial market volatility, for which they foresee no end in sight, state 
authorities must find means of protection for markets. This should involve developing 
institutional forms of self-insurance and policy instruments ‘that transfer resources 
across people over time to effectively counter financial shocks (World Bank 2013, 14). 
Yet contemporary crisis management demands that “resources should be provisioned 
for residual liabilities that the state may have to bear” (World Bank 2013, 33). How 
labour disproportionately absorbs the costs of risks with financial capital benefits 
disproportionately is left a mystery.  
 
The WDR 2014 then conceptually neutralizes the socially unequal processes required 
to manage financial risk. This entails setting financial risk management on broad 
conceptual grounds along a continuum of preparation to coping. The Report sees the 
continuum as defined by the “interlinked components of risk management”, which 
include knowledge, protection, insurance (which together constitute preparation), 
followed by coping (2013, 63). Knowledge acquisition and usage is framed as 
necessary for understanding the nature and likelihood of financial risks so as to reduce 
uncertainty and better inform actions (2013, 64). Public authorities should have an 
important in reducing financial uncertainty by facilitating access to and dissemination of 
reliable data on risk, but also by offering regulatory stability and predictability (2013, 
65). Protection involves building capacity to reduce negative outcomes and enhance 
positive ones (2013, 65). The public and state are recognized as the likely providers of 
protection against systemic risks such as economic crises (2013, 67). Insurance is 
meant to “cushion the blow” of shocks (2013, 67). In the Report, this means having 
instruments capable of transferring resources between “good and bad times” (that is, 
displacement in time for example through savings, formal insurance contracts, loans, 
credit lines, and hedging instruments) and to those “especially in need in bad times” 
(for example, social safety nets, community support, or other risk-pooling mechanisms) 
(2013, 67). As with protection, the Report suggests insurance can be provided by 
individual, purchased from the market, or obtained from the public sphere (2013, 67). In 
terms of extreme shocks, like financial crises, communities and states could provide 
the support against shocks not covered by market insurance (2013, 67). 
 
The WDR 2014 sees these three components as constituting preparation, that is, 
before the fact risk management (2013, 68). Coping, however, entails risk management 
actions taken after a risk (or an opportunity, the Report qualifies) has emerged (2013, 
68). This involves ensuring that the regulatory authorities’ knowledge base takes 
account of the new conditions and is used to implement necessary and available 
resources properly (2013, 69-70). Coping actions can range from minimal interventions 
that support a quick recovery to more extensive interventions required by larger shocks 
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(2013, 70). As an example of the latter, extensive type of intervention, the Report cites 
how the “good macroeconomic management allowed a number of developing countries 
to recover relatively quickly from the 2008–09 global financial crisis” (2013, 70).  
 
The WDR 2014 also delimits the range of legitimate financial policies derivable from 
the interlinked components of risk management. The Report does this by rendering a 
variety of market supporting practices actionable through a neoclassical economic and 
neoliberal interpretive lens and by representing this combined knowledge in ways that 
can be internalized by national authorities (2013, 217; 244). Knowledge production 
policies become functional to financial development, as national priorities should 
include better and system wide data collection and public dissemination; improved 
quality; leading to monetary transparency and disclosure of financial risks – in the 
interests of financial deepening. Protection takes an uncompromising conventional turn 
as priorities should include establishing legal frameworks; financial and central bank 
institutional independence; corporate governance standards; consumer protection and 
government transfer plans; financial deepening; stronger macroprudential and fiscal 
frameworks and institutions, leading to inflation targeting and flexible exchange rate 
regimes, and crisis preparedness plans. Insurance priorities add in consumer 
protection and mandatory insurance and macroprudential capital buffers but also 
countercyclical monetary policy and foreign reserve accumulation. In terms of coping 
after the risk appears, policy priorities include contract enforcement (that is, private 
property rights); failing bank resolution; emergency liquidity and bad debt resolution; 
preserved access to credit and blanket deposit guarantees; consumer protection; 
lending guarantees; support from IFIs leading to contingent credit lines. There is no 
mention of systemic re-evaluation as the current financialized world market is accepted 
as given, natural, and necessary. National best practices are naturally needed to 
protect a system that is both necessary and desirable, from the perspective of financial 
development and financial capital. 
The naturalized approach to financial risk and the conceptual generality at which the 
WDR 2014 frames financial risk management lends itself to broad-based consensus 
formation and uptake into national policy making processes. The concrete policy 
recommendations narrow the range of interpretation into a definitively market-oriented 
and neoliberal trajectory. The strategy of naturalization and conceptual generality 
obscure the underlying and exploitative social power and class relations that emerge in 
the actual concrete practices of financial risk management. As a result, serious 
contradictions emerge at a systemic level and with the role of the public sector. At this 
scale the Report’s narrative sees the likely provider being the state, which is the 
otherwise defined as inherently ‘corrupt’ and ‘inefficient’ (also see World Bank 2012). 
Moreover, while ideally open to democratic debate the Report has little to no time for 
actual democracy as the clearly demarcated confines of policy options reproduce the 
existing capitalist order. Indeed, policy anchors such as financial institutional 
independence actively militate against democratic accountability. Therein, the financial 
best practices ensure the least possible be done by public authorities to appease 
workers and the poor, while promoting market-based financial mechanisms that 
encourage broad-based financial inclusion processes that intensify financialization (that 
is, the dispossession of the poor and workers). The Report, in its approach to financial 
risk management in the aftermath of crisis, thus reflects continuity in the post-1980s 
neoliberal contention that all developmental problems can be best resolved by more 
exposure to market processes and competition. It represents an innovation insofar as 
the role of the state is more explicitly acknowledged in preserving the financial system 
by building capacity to manage financial risks, including socializing them, should the 
crisis be severe enough that market mechanisms are insufficient. This, however, needs 
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to be understood in its class-based foundations that privilege the needs of capital 
accumulation over the social reproduction aspirations of the majority of society as 
analysed in the Mexican and Turkish cases. 
 
Conclusion: An Alternative Agenda in the Aftermath of Crisis 
Just as forms of labour repression characterize Mexican and Turkish authorities’ 
responses in the aftermath of crisis, so too the World Bank’s response in its framing of 
financial risk management. In Mexico and Turkey, the intensification of workers’ 
repression can be seen through concrete post-crisis initiatives in economic decision-
making, economic restructuring, and financialization. The World Development Report 
2014 then mystifies neoliberal policies that depend on labour to stabilize global 
financial risks while concretely legitimizing the specific financial policies needed to 
reproduce the current financial architecture. 
 
The aftermath of crisis has neither led to a spontaneous resurgence of organized 
labour against neoliberal intensification nor to utter collapse. In Mexico, major labour 
unions like the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers) remain closely aligned to the 
government, and especially the ruling PRI. This facilitates the anchoring of labour costs 
to inflation and mitigates collective responses to the deepening of financialization. The 
continued precariousness of work and forced return of undocumented workers from the 
crisis-affected US has worsened matters are unionization levels continue to fall. Yet 
more independent and representative worker organizations have emerged and resisted 
authoritarian neoliberalism. The Tri-National Solidarity Alliance formed in 2010 drawing 
together progressive worker organizations across Mexico, the US, and Canada. In 
Mexico, more independent unions like the Frente Autentico de Trabajo and Union 
Nacional de Trabajadores are involved along side militant mine and metal workers, 
electricians, and telephone technicians. In 2013, the National Coordinating Committee 
of the Mexican Teachers’ Union led one the largest strikes in Mexico’s recent history. In 
2015 farm workers in the north led an unprecedented blockage of fresh produce 
deliveries and maquiladora workers challenged global giants like Foxconn. The 
common denominators included aspirations for better wages, working conditions, and 
more effective representation, as well as being repressed by the military and police in 
Mexico.  
 
Turkey illustrates a similar tendency, though the specifics differ. Conservative labour 
unions (such as Hak-Iş and Memur-Sen) have been drawn much closer to the ruling 
AKP, becoming privileged actors in official negotiations. Less government-friendly but 
worker-oriented unions like DISK, KESK, and Turk-Iş are systematically discriminated 
against in the collective bargaining process. Like Mexico, unionization in general is on 
a downward trend, yet most newly unionized workers are channelled towards the pro-
government organizations that have accepted minimal minimum wage increases and 
not challenged the AKP on its continued refusal to allow civil servants the legal right to 
strike. Nevertheless, the aftermath of crisis has encouraged unions like DISK and 
KESK into more open dialogues, often with the progressive HDP (People’s Democratic 
Party). Popular mobilizations, too, have emerged. The TEKEL resistance in late 2009 
and early 2010 saw thousands of workers push back against job losses driven by the 
privatization of the state-owned tobacco and alcohol enterprise. The 2013 Gezi Park 
resistance was a massive popular movement against the commodification of public 
space in central Istanbul. More recently in 2015, metal workers took on Renault and 
Bosch. The TEKEL and Gezi Park movements were brutally crushed by police forces, 
while the metal workers’ strike also suffered from the AKP deeming it a matter of 
‘national security’, and hence forcing them into a pro-government mediating council. As 
in Mexico, the aspirations of workers for better wages and conditions confront 
neoliberal governments’ power to suppress labour in the interests of capitalist stability 
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and global capital accumulation imperatives with little or no concern for democratic 
processes. 
 
Practically and methodologically, then, our analysis stresses that it is important not to 
perceive the national and international scales as separate but as interlinked within the 
totality of capitalist social relations. The processes of capitalist reproduction within 
national borders are constitutive of the capitalist world market, which in turn impacts 
back upon the national scale (von Braunmühl 1978). In this sense one can understand 
the enduring importance of national financial institutions, like central banks, that 
function in tandem with IFIs, like the World Bank – both of which emerged 
spontaneously within the historical development modern global capitalism (Itoh and 
Lapavitsas 1999). It follows from our perspective that contemporary economic policy 
making occurs in a context of reflexive, but unequal, interactions between nation states 
and IFIs, as co-constituted, contested, and complex material and discursive processes 
(cf. Taylor 2012; Andersson 2016). It also follows that when labour repression becomes 
an anchor of domestic economic management and capitalist stability imperatives that 
this also be reflected in and reproduced by otherwise neoliberal IFIs. Given the 
commonalities found between Mexico and Turkey (all be they variegated) and the 
WDR 2014, this is what has happened in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global crisis. 
Rather than project and undertake any fundamental reform to national or global 
finance, advocates of financialization have more firmly linked the fate of financial 
capitalism to the repression of labour. The mechanisms in place and advocated for 
disproportionately disadvantage and exploit the poor and working classes to the benefit 
of capital, especially finance. This is one clue as to why, despite the global crisis being 
the most costly in human history and despite bringing the financial world market to the 
precipice of collapse, there have been no fundamental changes to the functioning of 
world financial markets. There is a real need to privilege a new stream of finance and 
development research premised on the needs of the poor and labouring workers 
geared towards alternative policies that are viable, desirable, and achievable. Such 
policy work is likely to, and indeed should, be premised on disproportionately 
disadvantaging the needs of financial capital in the interests of popular classes’ 
aspirations and the democratization of finance for development.  
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Table 1 
Indicators 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP (annual 
variation) 
     
Mexico 5.1 4 4 1.4 2.1 
Turkey 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.0 3.3 
Exchange rate 
(per US dollar) 
     
Mexico 12.63 12.42 13.16 12.77 13.29 
Turkey 1.54  1.89 1.78 2.13  2.32  
Capital account 
(% of the GDP) 
     
Mexico 4.6 4.5 4.3 5.2 4.4 
Turkey 
(capital and 
financial 
account) 
7.8 8.3 8.7 8.8 5.2 (proj) 
Current account 
(% of GDP) 
     
Mexico -0.5 -1.1 -1.3 -2.4 -2.1 
Turkey -6.2 -9.6 -6.1 -7.9 -6.4 
Gross 
International 
reserves (billions 
of US dollars) 
     
Mexico 120.6 149.2 167.1 180.2 195.7 
Turkey 86.1 88.4 119.4 130.3 135.3 
(proj) 
Interest rates      
Mexico 4.40 4.24 4.24 3.75 3 
Turkey 
(one week repo 
near average) 
c.7.0 c.6.0 c.5.5 c.4.5 c.9.0 
Public debt (% 
GDP) 
     
Mexico 27.1 28.2 30.6 32.6 34.45 
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Turkey 42.3 39.1 36.2 36.2 33.7 
(proj) 
Real Minimum 
wages (In 2014 
constant prices 
at 2014 USD 
PPPs)* 
     
Mexico 2101 2115 2119 2128 2125 
Turkey 10115 10419 10701 10898 11038 
Inflation       
Mexico 4.4 3.82 3.57 3.8 4.01 
Turkey (CPI) 6.4 6.8 8.1 6.6 8.1 
Inflation (Food 
prices) 
     
Mexico 5.1 6.02 7.2 5.3 4.8 
Turkey -- -- -- 9.1 12.6 
Source: Banxico Database, BAT 2014; BAT 2015; IMF 2014, OECD Main Economic 
Indicators 2015, OECD 2014, IMF 2014.  
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